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ESSAYS




This Essay considers the recent conservative turn against
compensatory mitigation policies. Those policies allow
environmentally destructive activities to proceed, but on the condition
that regulated actors compensate by protecting or improving
environmental conditions somewhere else. Over the last four decades,
those policies have become increasingly prevalent within
environmentallaw, and they have enjoyed support from across much of
the ideological spectrum, with most of the critiques coming from
environmentalists. Recently, however, compensatory mitigation
policies have become targets of conservative ire. This Essay asks why
that has happened
I argue that there are several explanations. First, the tendency to
equate compensatory mitigation with a capitahst or neoliberal agenda
mistakes the true roots of compensatory mitigation policies, which
were often helpful to but were not creations of the business
establishment. Second, as compensatory mitigation policy has grown
up (a process that still is far from complete), it has become more
demanding for regulated entities. Third, the deals promised by
compensatory mitigation will seem less enticing to regulated entities as
they begin to sense weakness in the underlying mandates of
environmental law These factors do not fully explain the recent
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conservative tum, but they do offer partial explanations for its
emergence, as well as cautionary notes for those who beleve-as I
do-that compensatory mitigation should be an important part of the
future of environmental Jaw.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2017, at a Western Governors' Association meeting in Whitefish,
Montana, Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke boasted about signing an order "to
end the practice of compensatory mitigation."' He then added perhaps the
strongest-and least accurate-critique the practice has ever received from
a top executive branch official: "I call it un-American." 2
By this time, such statements were not entirely surprising. Since 2015,
when the Obama Administration took several prominent steps designed to
improve compensatory mitigation practices,3 some conservative politicians
had made no secret of their disdain for the practice. Representative Louie
Gohmert, for example, charged that the Obama Administration's policies
were "another attempt to increase the unilateral expansion of the executive
branch and the influence of land managers outside of their fiefdoms,"4 while
1 Perry Backus, Zinke Talks Issues at Western Governors' Association Meeting,
MIssouLAN (June 28, 2017), https://perrna.cc/YGF6-3A9Y; see Ryan Zinke, Sec'y of the Interior,
Order No. 3349, American Energy Independence (Mar. 29, 2017), https://perma.c/8TMA-9URV;
see also Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,094 (Mar. 31, 2017) (rescinding
President Obama's November 3, 2015 action on compensatory mitigation).
2 Backus, supra note 1. In fact, the idea is distinctively American. See Marie Hrabanski,
The Biodiversity Offsets as Market-Based Instruments in Global Governance: Oigins, Success
and Controveisies, 15 ECOSYSTEM SERVS. 143, 145 (2015) (noting that compensatory mitigation
policy development began primarily in the United States); Calvet Coralie et al., Tracking the
Ozigins and Development of Bibdiversity Offsetting in Academic Research and Its Implications
for Conservation: A Review, 192 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 492, 495 (2015) (finding that
academic writing about compensatory mitigation policies began in the United States).
3 See, e.g, Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Endangered Species Act
Compensatory Mitigation Policy, 81 Fed. Reg. 95,316, 95,316 (Dec. 27, 2016); U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service Mitigation Policy, 81 Fed. Reg. 83,440, 83,440 (Nov. 21, 2016); BUREAU OF LAND
MGMT., MITIGATION: HANDBOOK H-1794-1, at iv (2016); U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENT
MANUAL, CHAPTER 6: IMPLEMENTING MITIGATION AT THE LANDSCAPE-SCALE 4 (2015); Memorandum
on Mitigating Impacts on Natural Resources from Development and Encouraging Related
Private Investment, 81 Fed. Reg. 68,743, 68,744 (Nov. 6, 2015).
4 Imposition of New Regulations through the President's Memorandum on Mitigation
Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Ovemight and Investigations of the H Comm. on
20181 TURN AGAINST COMPENSATORY MITIGATION
Senator Dan Sullivan warned that "compensatory mitigation often appears
arbitrary and even punitive to those of us trying to navigate this complex
process."'
* Nevertheless, even if environmental commentators understood that
compensatory mitigation was becoming a target, they puzzled about the
reasons why.6 For decades, compensatory mitigation policies had enjoyed
bipartisan support. They had emerged and advanced under both Democratic
and Republican administrations,7 and compensatory mitigation enjoyed a
reputation as the sort of market-friendly regulatory instrument that even
conservatives were supposed to embrace. Indeed, some academics still
refer to incentive-based environmental policies-a category that includes
compensatory mitigation-as a form of regulatory minimalism.. And until
recently, the harshest critiques of compensatory mitigation policies tended
to come from environmentalists and left-leaning academics, some of whom
derided the policies as part of a larger neoliberal project of extending
capitalism's empire.'o For a self-styled deal-making ubercapitalist and his
supporting cast of deregulators to turn against compensatory mitigation
seemed kind of weird."
Nat. Res., 114th Cong. 3 (2016) [hereinafter Hearings on the President's Memorandum on
Mitigation] (statement of Rep. Louie Gohmert, Chairman, S. Comm. on Oversight and
Investigation) (describing President Obama's mitigation memorandum).
5 Federal Mitigation Requirements and Interagency Coordination Related to the Economic
Development on Federal, State, and Pivate Lands: Joint Yeld Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Energy and Nat. Res. and the Subcomm. on Fsheries, Water, and Wildlife of the S Comm. on
Env't &Pub. Works, 114th Cong. 4 (2015) (statement of Sen. Sullivan, Alaska).
6 See, e.g, Greg Zimmerman, What's Interior Secretary Zinke's Beef with "Compensatory
Mtigadon?, "WESrWISE (June 30, 2017), https://perma.ce/GN5R-DFMB (explaining that Secretary
Zinke has not clearly explained why he opposes compensatory mitigation); see also Jim Salzman,
The Overlooked Part of Thzmp'sExecutive Order on Clrmate Change, LEGAL PLANET (Apr. 6, 2017),
https://perma.ccA2JH-5Z5T (questioning the reasoning behind the Trump Administration's
opposition to mitigation banking).
7 See Dave Owen, Little Streams and Legal Transformations, 2017 UTAH L. REv. 1, 4, 23-42
(describing the evolution of regulatory protections for small streams).
8 See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 6 ("[Ijt's precisely the type of free-market solution to
conservation and environmental protections that Republicans have always supported.").
9 Eg., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3-4, 6 (2014); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism
andExperimentalismin the Administradve State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 58 (2011).
10 See, e.g, Brain Bischer et al., Toward a Synthesized Clitque of Neoliberal Biodiversity
Conservation, CAPITALISM NATURE SOCIAUSM, June 2012, at 4, 8 (arguing that the expansion of
policies that involve payments for ecosystem services-a category that includes compensatory
mitigation-"is about finding new arenas for markets to operate in and thus to expand the
remit, and ultimately the circulation of capital").
1 Eg., Salzman, supra note 6 ("It seems an odd step for an administration with an avowed
affinity for business to destroy in one of its very first acts arguably the most pro-market
environmental initiative of the Obama administration."); see also Hearings on the President's
Memorandum on Mgation, supra note 4, at 3-4 (statement of Rep. Debbie Dingell, Ranking
Member, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations) (noting bipartisan and business support
for compensatory mitigation policies and stating, "I am somewhat baffled by the perspective
offered here on the other side of the aisle today.").
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Yet this turn of events has been building for a long time. And it has been
building not just because conservative politics now seem defined by
rejection of anything the Obama Administration did, though that impulse
toward rejection probably does play a role. The reasons, instead, run deeper,
and they have been coalescing since the 1980s, when compensatory
mitigation policy first shuffled onto the national stage." Compensatory
mitigation was never really a product of resurgent capitalism. 3 It instead
was largely a creation of the bureaucracy, and while it evolved in ways that
were friendly to some private entrepreneurs, it appeals primarily to business
entities that are ready to accept and work within the complex regimes of
modern environmental law (or that see no other choice) and to
professionalized regulatory agencies and environmental groups that are
willing to work closely with businesses. 4 It appeals, in other words, to
people who believe in regulated capitalism. It arouses some concern from
the subset of environmentalists that views business interests as incorrigibly
anti-environmental.1 5 And to conservatives who disdain any compromise
with the administrative state, distrust complex policy instruments, and wear
anti-environmentalism as a badge of honor, compensatory mitigation is
likely to be particularly repellant.
This Essay explores the conservative turn against compensatory
mitigation. Part II explains what compensatory mitigation is and how it
developed a reputation as a market-friendly, nonpartisan form of regulation.
Part III turns to the historical evolution of compensatory mitigation
practices. It explains how the realities of compensatory mitigation undercut
some of the more liberal critiques of the practice, and how those realities set
the stage for emerging conservative opposition. Part IV turns to the actual
emergence of that opposition, beginning with the courts and then turning to
present-day administrative and legislative policy fights. Part V closes by
considering the future of compensatory mitigation. For people who believe
that compensatory mitigation is an imperfect but promising policy option,'
that future includes causes for concern: with skepticism on the left and
outright opposition on the right, compensatory mitigation may now occupy a
position analogous to a politician whose coalition is just a little too small.
But even if compensatory mitigation policies may be vulnerable because
they do not fit neatly into the most popular narratives of environmental
politics, the functionality of a policy also has some relevance in the real
12 See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 76-117 and accompanying text.
15 See, e.g., David Ehrenfeld, Neoiberalization of Conservation, 22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
1091, 1092 (2008).
16 In addition to ideological critiques, compensatory mitigation also has received extensive
functional criticism. E.g, Joseph W. Bull et al., Biodiverity Offsets in Theory and Practice, 47
ORYx 369, 369-70 (2013) (synthesizing critiques). That criticism has led some people to dismiss
the practice as hopeless, while others-myself included-view it as promising policy in need of
improvement. I am not aware of any scholars or policymakers who think compensatory
mitigation is just fine and in need of no further reform.
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world. Compensatory mitigation emerged because it has the potential to
address real needs. So long as meaningful environmental regulation
remains-and, for now, it does-those needs also will remain, and so too,
hopefully, will a continued effort to advance and improve policies for
compensatory mitigation.
II. WHAT IS COMPENSATORY MITIGATION?
To understand the current turn against compensatory mitigation, and
the reasons it has been surprising, it helps to first know something about
what the practice is. This Part therefore provides a basic primer on
compensatory mitigation and explains how it came to have a reputation as a
business-friendly, market-oriented kind of policy.
The core concept of compensatory mitigation is simple. Regulated
entities receive permission to engage in environmentally degrading activities
that otherwise would be prohibited, and in return, they provide extra
environmental benefits at some other time or place." So, for example, a
developer might receive permission to build a shopping mall in an area with
protected wetlands, and in return for receiving its permit, the developer
would restore wetlands somewhere else.
This basic concept is now integral to the implementation of many
environmental law regimes.' In the United States, Clean Water Act" section
404 drives much of the compensatory mitigation work,"' but compensatory
mitigation also occurs under the National Environmental Policy Act,21 the
Endangered Species Act,22 the natural resource damages provisions of
several statutes, the Federal Power Act,24 and provisions of state laws. In
17 See Palmer Hough & Morgan Robertson, Mitigation Under Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act: Where It Comes from, WhatIt Means, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT. 15, 16, 23-24
(2009).
18 See COMM. ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES ET AL., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 61-63 (2001) (summarizing
several laws that provide compensatory mitigation requirements).
19 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2012).
20 Id. § 1344.
21 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2012); see COMM.
ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES ET AL., supra note 18, at 62 (summarizing its applicability to
compensatory mitigation).
22 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012); see id §§ 1538-1539
(allowing otherwise prohibited takes of listed species so long as those takes are adequately
mitigated, among other requirements).
23 See Memorandum from Steve Glomb, Dir., Office of Restoration & Damage Assessment,
to Director of Bureau of Indian Affairs et al. 2 (Dec. 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/M2CU-LNRY
(noting that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675; the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 33, 43, and 46 U.S.C.); and the Clean Water Act all have natural
resource damages provisions that can lead to compensatory mitigation).
24 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-825r; see Dave Owen & Colin Apse, Trading Dams, 48 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1043, 1079 (2015).
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other countries, compensatory mitigation policies also are on the rise, and
they have received the active support of many international organizations
devoted to the growth and development of environmental law.2 6
In practice, regulators and regulated entities use three primary
mechanisms to implement compensatory mitigation policies. The first is
known as "permittee-responsible" mitigation." As the name suggests,
permittee-responsible mitigation is carried out by the same entity that
receives permission to cause environmental degradation (or by its
contractors).a The second two types both fall within the umbrella category
of third-party mitigation. In a mitigation banking system, the third party is
typically a private, entrepreneurial entity that creates, restores, or protects
environmental resources and then markets credits for equivalent
environmental degradation. 9 Entities that purchase those credits then can
engage in environmentally degrading activities. In an in-lieu fee program, the
third party manages a fund into which permittees can pay, and it then uses
the aggregated funds to support environmental restoration or protection."
Some in-lieu fee programs are managed by public entities, while others are
managed by nonprofits. 3' In both of these third-party systems, liability for the
performance of the mitigation shifts from the permittee to the mitigation
provider.32
One last terminological distinction is important here. In regulatory
parlance, compensatory mitigation falls within the broader term
"mitigation," which also includes measures to avoid or minimize impacts to
protected resources.3 Under United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)
25 See, eg., Amy Wilson Morris & Jessica Owley, Mitigating the Impacts of the Renewable
Energy Gold Rush, 15 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 293, 322-24 (2014) (describing compensatory
mitigation under California's species protection laws).
26 See Corahe Calvet et al., The Biodiversity Offsetting Dilemma: Between Economic
Rationales and Ecological Dynamics, 7 SUSTAINABILITY 7357, 7358 (2015); Bruce A. McKenney &
Joseph M. Kiesecker, Pobicy Development for Biodiversity Offsets: A Review of Offset
Frameworks, 45 ENVTL. MGMT. 165, 166-69 (2010) (describing and comparing programs from
multiple countries).
27 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WETLANDS COMPENSATORY MITIGATION (2015),




31 See JESSICA WILKINSON ET AL., ENVTL. L. INST., THE STATUS AND CHARACTER OF IN-LIEU FEE
MITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 17-18 tbl.2 (2006), https://perma.cc/TA2V-JFHU. In Virginia
and Maine, the Nature Conservancy administers state-sponsored in-lieu fee programs. See
Virginia Aquatic Resources Tust Fund Freshwater Conservation in Virgma, NATURE
CONSERVANCY, https://perma.cc/7B6N-UADK (last visited Apr. 7, 2018); see also Maine In Lieu
Fee Compensation Program (1L) and Maine Natural Resource Conservation Program
(MNRCP), ME. DEP'T ENVTL. PROTECTION, https://perma.cc/73FP-CAHP (last visited Apr. 7,
2018).
32 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 27. In contrast, while a permittee may hire a
contractor to carry out permittee-responsible mitigation, the permittee remains legally
responsible for completing that mitigation. Id
33 COMM. ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES ET AL., supra note 18, at 65.
[Vol. 48:265270
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and United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) policies," which
have been widely imitated by other agencies and in other countries,
compensatory mitigation is a third-best approach, and impacts should be
avoided and then, to the extent avoidance is impossible, minimized before
compensatory mitigation takes place. This prioritization system is widely
known as the "mitigation hierarchy."07
Ill. CONSERVATIVE BONA FIDES?
So how, one might wonder, did compensatory mitigation earn its
reputation as a market-friendly, neoliberal policy? There are several reasons.
First, by replacing flat prohibitions with the possibility of deal-making,
compensatory mitigation appears to give flexibility to regulated entities. In a
system without compensatory mitigation, the law may appear to simply
prohibit some forms of environmental degradation. So, for example, prior to
1982, when Congress amended the Endangered Species Act to allow some
forms of compensatory mitigation, the Act seemed to prohibit all actions
that "took" protected species, even if that prohibition meant the end of a
proposed project." A compensatory mitigation policy opens up another
choice: the project can proceed, but with compensation for its impacts.39 If
the absence of this compensatory option really corresponds with full and
vigorous enforcement of the law (in practice, that can be a big if), then a
compensatory mitigation option creates significant flexibility for the
regulated.o
Second, as many observers have pointed out, compensatory mitigation
requires commodification of environmental values." In order for a
compensatory mitigation system to work, regulators need to decide how
much mitigation a permittee must provide, or how many credits it needs to
buy from a bank (and how many credits the bank's work entitles it to sell),
or how much money a developer must provide to an in-lieu fee program.4 2
34 EPA and the Corps jointly implement the Clean Water Act section 404 program. See Dave
Owen, Regional Federal Administradon, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58, 81-82 (2016) (describing the
division of responsibilities).
35 See BECCA MADSEN ET AL., STATE OF BIODIVERSITY MARKETS: OFFSET AND COMPENSATION
PROGRAMS WORLDWIDE, at iv, 8, 32, 59 (2010), https://perma.cc/WC38-MKK5 (describing multiple
programs that use the mitigation hierarchy).
36 Id. at 5.
37 Id. at 5, 24-25.
38 See Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heel of the
Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 279, 294-95 (1998).
39 See id. at 295-96; see also Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A)
(2012) (allowing takes if, along with meeting other requirements, the applicant for a take permit
has mitigated the impacts of the take).
40 See Sheldon, supra note 38, at 298 (noting that Congress intended to provide flexibility).
41 See generally James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodiflication of
Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000) (describing environmental trading markets).
42 See Owen, supra note 34, at 102-03 (describing these decisions); see also Morgan
Robertson, The Work of Wetland Credit Markets: Two Cases in Entrepreneurial Wetland
271
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And because no two habitats are exactly the same, the answer cannot be,
"recreate the very same thing that you destroyed."" Instead, the architects of
compensatory mitigation systems must come up with quantifiable
currencies of exchange, which typically are proxy measures of
environmental values." This practice of developing currencies imbues
environmental regulation with economic concepts and language, and it can
seem as though ecological value is being subsumed within an economic
framework.4 5
Third, the emergence of mitigation banking has influenced the
reputation of the entire field of compensatory mitigation. Many mitigation
bankers really are unapologetic capitalists." They may take pride in the
quality of the habitats they restore, but they are also in it for the money;
their goal is to turn environmental restoration into profit. For some
environmental advocates, that marriage of restoration and profit is
appealing; arguing that environmentalism is good for business can be a wise
strategic choice. But the environmental movement grew in large part out of
distrust of the perceived excesses of capitalism, and an embrace of
capitalistic environmental fixes makes many environmental advocates a
little queasy. 7 Not all of compensatory mitigation reflects that embrace;
mitigation banking is just one species of compensatory mitigation policy."
But it is a particularly intriguing form of compensatory mitigation-
permittee-responsible mitigation may be more prevalent,49 but it is
Banldng, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT. 35, 47 (2009) (describing regulatory review of
mitigation banking).
43 See generally James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, "No Net Loss" Instrument Choice in Wetlands
Protection, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 323 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., 2007) (noting the
challenges associated with applying trading systems to habitat).
44 See Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 41, at 623-24 (noting this heavy reliance on proxy
measures).
45 See Morgan M. Robertson, The Nature That Capital Can See: Science, State, and Market
in the Commodification of Ecosystem Services, 24 ENV'T & PLANNING D: SOCIETY & SPACE 367,
371-72 (2006) ("The knowledge system of science is being put into new articulatory
relationships with the standards of capital, and scientific data are doing important new work in
expanding the circuits of capital.").
46 This is an aggregate impression formed from multiple research interviews (for previous
research papers, including Owen, supra note 34, and Owen & Apse, supra note 24) and more
informal conversations with mitigation bankers.
47 See, e.g, Daniel F. Doak et al., Opinion, What Is the Fliture of Conservation?, 29 TRENDS
ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 77, 79 (2014) ("[T]he assumption, and hence reinforcement, of only
economic motivations for conservation ignores and may thus diminish the importance of
political, scientific, philosophical, and religious motivations for conservation found across
different nations and cultures."); Ehrenfeld, supra note 15, at 1092 ("The. reduction of all
conservation problems to economic terms is counter-productive and dangerous.").
48 See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (describing permittee-responsible
mitigation and in-lieu fee programs).
49 U.S ARMY ENG'R INST. FOR WATER RES. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2015-R-03, THE
MITIGATION RULE RETROSPECTIVE: A REVIEW OF THE 2008 REGULATIONS GOVERNING
COMPENSATORY MITIGATION FOR LOSSES OF AQUATIC RESOURCES 11 (2015) (noting that for the
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comparatively dull-and mitigation banking therefore gets an
overabundance of attention.' Consequently, it can seem to spread its
capitalistic aura out over the entire compensatory mitigation field."
Fourth, the timing of compensatory mitigation's emergence has
contributed to its reputation for market-friendliness. While the basic idea of
compensatory mitigation has existed for a very long time, the United States'
compensatory mitigation policies rose to prominence during the 1980s and
1990s, at a time when deregulation was also ascendant." Early on, at least,
the two movements weren't entirely disconnected. As one former
Department of Interior lawyer who worked in the Reagan Administration
explained to me, there were some highly ideological and anti-regulatory
political appointees who saw compensatory mitigation as a convenient fig
leaf-a set of minor and unenforceable commitments whose primary value
was to allow projects to proceed. That hope was exactly concordant with
some environmentalists' fears, and at the time, it often had ample basis in
reality. Compensatory mitigation has never fully shed the resulting stain."
Fifth and finally, the intellectual climate surrounding the emergence of
compensatory mitigation policies partially explains their reputation.
Particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, some of environmental law's central
academic debates pitted advocates of economics-based regulatory
methodologies against more traditional environmentalists, who argued for
regulatory schemes based in moral values and in non-economic measures of
public health. These debates took place on multiple fronts, including
disputes over the use of regulatory cost-benefit analysis and quantitative risk
Corps's compensatory mitigation authorizations between 2010 and 2015, "41% used mitigation
bank credits, 11% used in-lieu fee program credits, 37% did on-site permittee responsible
mitigation, and 11% conducted off-site permittee-responsible mitigation").
50 See Owen, supra note 7, at 36 (noting that, in some parts of the country, mitigation
banking is still "in its infancy").
51 See, e.g, Valerie Boisvert, Conservation Banldng Mechanisms and the Economization of
Nature: An InstitutionalAnalysis, 15 ECOSYSTEM SERVS. 134, 135 (2015) ("The vocabulary used to
describe these mechanisms-banks, bankers, credits, debits, etc-and the associated legal
framework are eloquent testimony to the underlying neoliberal vision.").
52 See Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United States
Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law's Fist Three Decades in the Uited
States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 85-87, 92-97 (2001) (describing deregulatory pushes).
53 Telephone Interview with Don Barry, former attorney, Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Dep't
of the Interior (Sept. 8, 2017).
5 See COMM. ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES ET AL., supra note 18, at 120-22 (providing, in
2001, a comprehensive critique of recent and contemporary practices).
55 See, e.g, Albert C. Lin, Myths of Environmental Law, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 45, 79
(identifying compensatory mitigation as a myth). In some realms, it also has continued to earn
that reputation. See, e.g., Margaret A. Palmer & Kelly L. Hondula, Restoration as Miligation:
Analysis of Stream Mitigation for Coal Mining Impacts in Southern Appalachia, 48 ENvTL. Sci. &
TECH. 10,552, 10,554 (2014) (finding that stream restoration efforts are not providing anything
close to mitigation for the impacts of coal mining).
56 See DANIEL A. FARBER, Eco-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN
AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 35-36 (1999) (summarizing this debate).
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assessment,57 and one particularly important front was a debate about
whether to employ market-oriented regulatory approaches, like cap-and-
trade systems, or traditional technology-based permitting." Compensatory
mitigation systems are close cousins to cap-and-trade schemes, and even if
the debaters tended to focus on air-quality regulation rather than habitat-
protection systems, it was easy to think that compensatory mitigation policy
was at least part of the discussion." Because that discussion sometimes
occurred in explicitly ideological terms-disparaging traditional
environmental regulatory systems as "Soviet-style" centralization was a
common trope-it was easy to identify compensatory mitigation. with the
more conservative camps in an ideologically tinged debate."
The net result of all these factors was to create a widespread
impression that the emergence of compensatory mitigation was driven by a
rightward political turn. 6' This view remains common; many articles by
environmental scholars evince an uneasy distrust toward compensatory
mitigation, which the scholars view as a poster child for neoliberal policy.2
A seemingly obvious corollary of this view is that compensatory mitigation
policy should be supported by conservative politicians. But there is a
difference between a somewhat casual identification-primarily by its
critics-of a policy with conservative politics and the actual existence of
conservative roots and conservative support. The importance of that
difference is now coming to light.
57 Compare CAss R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY
PROTECTION, at ix, xi (2002) (discussing the emerging cost-benefit state), with Frank Ackerman
& Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1562-64 (2002) ("[Clost-benefit analysis is fundamentally incapable of
delivering on its promise of more economically efficient decisions about protecting human life,
health, and the environment.").
5 Compare Wendy E. Wagner, The 7)iTumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REV. 83, 84 (arguing that technology-based standards are the most important approach for
pollution control), with Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming
Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1341-47 (1985) (discussing the benefits of market-
oriented trading regimes).
59 See generally, e.g, Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 43 (discussing habitat exchanges).
60 See, e.g, Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 58, at 1334. In these debates, Ackerman and
Stewart's perceived conservatism was only relative. Their writing-in this vein and others-
makes clear their support for the basic goals of environmental regulations and their willingness
to impose high costs on businesses. See, e.g., id. at 1343-44 (arguing that tradable pollution
entitlements should be auctioned, a practice that would heighten costs for businesses and raise
large sums to support public regulation).
61 See, e.g, Bischer et al., supra note 10, at 8 (describing compensatory mitigation policy
as an expansion of capitalism's empire).
62 Eg, Morgan M. Robertson, The Neoiberalizadon of Ecosystem Services: Wetland
Mitgation Banldng and Problems in Environmental Governance, 35 GEOFORUM 361, 361-63
(2004). While Robertson's work often identifies mitigation banking with neoliberalism, his
research also frequently explains ways in which that labeling is overly simplistic. Id. at 371.
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IV. COMBAT BIOLOGISTS
In the early 1980s, employees at the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) referred to their colleagues who worked on Clean Water Act
section 404 implementation as "combat biologists. "" These combat
biologists' job was to review stream and wetland fill permits issued by the
Corps.6 The Corps, in that era, viewed itself as a construction and economic
development agency; enforcing environmental protections was an unfamiliar
and weakly embraced role.' But at staff levels in FWS (and EPA), a strong
commitment to environmental protection remained." And so began a policy
fight that continues to the present day, with outcomes that have helped
define the political valence of compensatory mitigation.
The sides of the debate, as it initially emerged, are easy to summarize.
Corps staff wanted less compensatory mitigation and was less committed to
the measures it did adopt, while FWS wanted more, and it wanted mitigation
measures to be effective. 67 Behind those simple positions lurked a larger
philosophical debate about what compensatory mitigation was supposed to
achieve. To some at the Corps, it was a fig leaf to facilitate de facto
deregulation.n Support among elected politicians, including some
Republicans, was too strong to ignore the mandates of environmental law; a
show of compliance was necessary.w And compensatory mitigation offered a
way of granting permits while pretending to protect the environment." To
FWS staff, in contrast, compensatory mitigation was supposed to be
something real. It was a way of securing genuine environmental
compensation for the impacts of permitted projects."
In the early years of the debate, the anti-regulators seemed to be
prevailing. For many types of stream and wetland fills, regulators required
no compensatory mitigation at all." Where they did require compensatory
mitigation, the efforts were often somewhat cursory and were neither
monitored effectively nor backed by any kind of scientific theory of
63 Telephone Interview with Don Barry, supra note 53.
64 Id
65 See Owen, supra note 7, at 18-19 (quoting an FWS staff biologist who worked with the
Corps during this era: "They were old school Corps of Engineers, damn the torpedoes, we're
going to issue permits. We can't let these lowly fish stand in our way.").
66 See id. at 23-24 ("The Corps's partner agencies-the FWS ... in addition to the EPA-
also were engaged in constant discussions with the Corps staff, and often pushed for more
thorough and aggressive wetland protections.").




71 See Edward T. LaRoe, Wetland Habitat Migation: An Historical Overview, NAT'L
WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Wash. D.C.), Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 8, 9 ("[Ilt is the only
method for allowing development, while at the same time ensuring no net loss in resource
benefits to the public."). Mr. LaRoe worked for FWS at the time he published the article. Id. at 8.
72 See Owen, supra note 7, at 20-22 (describing instances of lax and/or minimal Corps
efforts in the initial years of Clean Water Act implementation).
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environmental restoration.7 3 Contemporary reports amply documented the
dismal results. 4 Studies of compensatory mitigation in this early era found
that the restored or replacement wetlands had little ecological value or
quickly failed, were often disconnected from surrounding habits, and were
subject to spotty and inadequate oversight."' Yet the environmental
destruction for which mitigation was supposed to compensate was entirely
real.
These early failings helped give compensatory mitigation its lingering
stigma. 6 But they also inspired FWS, EPA, and eventually the Corps itself to
seek reform. One key reform was a move toward applying mitigation
requirements to smaller and smaller impacts, so that the scope of
compensatory mitigation changed.7 From the 1990s through the 2000s, the
Corps and EPA steadily reduced the thresholds for requiring permitting and
for requiring compensatory mitigation, and they (and some state regulators)
also expanded compensatory mitigation requirements to cover impacts to
streams.78 In combination, these changes meant that many projects that once
could proceed without any mitigation at all now required compensation."
EPA and the Corps also increasingly favored "mitigation in advance.""o
Advance mitigation must be provided, and must demonstrate some value,
before it can be the basis for permitting environmentally destructive
activities.8' It contrasts with mitigation provided after environmentally
destructive activities occur. The advantages of the former approach should
be fairly obvious: the compensation occurs sooner, and regulators should
have more confidence that real mitigation will take place."' Initially,
however, the latter approach was much more common." Regulated entities
73 See id. at 26 n. 166 (quoting a Corps biologist: "Back in the day somebody may have said,
'Well I'm just gonna go create some wetlands' and we'd say 'OK, here's your permit' without any
level of detail of what you're gonna do and how you're gonna do it, what your success is. If it
didn't work, then, 'ok, well no big deal."').
74 E.g, COMM. ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES ET AL., supra note 18, at 190-97 tbl.A-1
(compiling and summarizing studies).
75 See id.; see also U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-898, WETLANDS PROTECTION:
CORPS OF ENGINEERS DOES NOT HAVE AN EFFECTIvE OVERSIGHT APPROACH TO ENSURE THAT
COMPENSATORY MITIGATION IS OCCURRING 4-6 (2005) (discussing the inconsistencies and
inadequacies of then-current oversight regimes).
76 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
77 See Hough & Robertson, supra note 17, at 18 (noting this trend).
78 Owen, supra note 7, at 28-30, 34-36.
79 Id. at 38.
80 See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594,
19,609 (Apr. 10, 2008) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 325 and 332; 40 C.F.R. pt. 230) (describing
a mitigation rule's preference for "encouraging compensatory mitigation planning to be
performed in advance of permitted activities").
81 Memorandum on Mitigating Impacts on Natural Resources from Development and
Encouraging Related Private Investment, 81 Fed. Reg. 68,743, 68,744 (Nov. 6, 2015).
82 See Royal C. Gardner, Money for Nothing? The Rise of Wetland Fee Mtigadon, 19 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 39 (2000) (discussing the drawbacks of fee mitigation).
83 See id. at 2 ("Traditionally, the developer ... has implemented the mitigation project
concurrent with or after the development project.").
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would often build first and compensate later, or would pay into an in-lieu
fund that would only begin restoring or protecting aquatic habitats once
enough money had accumulated to start projects-if it did so at all.8"
Consequently, a preference for advance mitigation has been an element of
most recent efforts at compensatory mitigation reform.
These changes coincided with a shift toward watershed-scale mitigation
planning." In the 1980s and 1990s, regulators preferred for compensatory
mitigation to occur as close as possible to the sites of destruction and
preferably in the same place.86 This approach made intuitive sense; if
compensation occurs far away from the original site of destruction, that
geographic disparity raises questions about who is really being
compensated.7 But in practice, the preference for on-site mitigation often
worked poorly." Often the best sites aren't in the same areas where
development is occurring." The geographic configuration of restoration sites
matters as well, and restoring a site that provides links between two areas of
existing habitat may do far more environmental good than creating an
isolated "wetland" at the edge of a shopping mall parking lot. 0 Consolidated
mitigation sites also are easier to inspect, which makes regulatory oversight
of mitigation more feasible." For all of these reasons, critics argued for a
84 See id. at 4, 39 (summarizing critiques of in-lieu fee programs).
85 See ENVTL. LAW INST. & NATURE CONSERVANCY, WATERSHED APPROACH HANDBOOK:
IMPROVING OUTCOMES AND INCREASING BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH WETLAND AND STREAM
RESTORATION AND PROTECTION PROJECTS 15-16 (2014), https://perma.ce/FQ7W-2TRL.
86 See Memorandum of Agreement Between Robert W. Page, Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, & LaJuana S. Wilcher, Assistant Adm'r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency on the
Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines (Feb. 6,
1990), https://perma.cc/5VZH-FJB4. The memo explained:
Compensatory actions ... should be undertaken when practicable, in areas adjacent or
continuous to the discharge site (on-site compensatory mitigation). If on-site
compensatory mitigation is not practicable, off-site compensatory mitigation should be
undertaken in the same geographic area if practicable (i.e., in close proximity and, to the
extent possible, the same watershed).
Id at 4.
87 See Philip Womble & Martin Doyle, The Geography of Trading Ecosystem Services: A
Case Study of Wetland and Stream Compensatory Mitlgation Markets, 36 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV.
229, 232, 243 (2012) (describing the failings of on-site, in-kind mitigation).
88 Owen, supra note 7, at 25 n.165 ("[W]hen we started doing wetland mitigation it was on-
site, one-to-one mitigation and for the most part failing miserably." (quoting Telephone
Interview with Regulatory Dist. Chief (Nov. 20, 2014))).
89 See Theodore C. Weber & William L. Allen, Beyond On-Site Midgadon: An Integrated,
Multi-Scale Approach to Environmental Mitigation and Stewardship for Transportation
Projects, 96 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 240, 251 fig.5, 252 (2010) (showing how mapping
technologies can be used to identify optimal sites for protection or restoration).
90 See N6lida R. Villasefior et al., The Relative Importance of Aquadc and Terrestrial
Variables for Frogs in an Urbanizing Landscape: Key Insights for Sustainable Urban
Development 157 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 26, 32-33 (2017) (explaining the importance of
terrestrial habitats and connectivity to wetland-dependent amphibians).
91 Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Bankng, and
Talings, 81 IOWA L. REV. 527, 560 (1996).
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
shift away from the emphasis on on-site, in-kind mitigation and in favor of
selecting mitigation sites in accordance with watershed-based planning.9 2 By
the late 2000s, that critique had found receptive audiences in federal
agencies. In a joint rule issued in 2008-and specifically demanded by
Congress"-EPA and the Corps officially endorsed this watershed-based
approach. 4
All these policy reforms coupled with cultural shifts. There are
exceptions-the Appalachian coalfields have been a particularly intense
flashpoint"-but in general, staff at FWS and EPA no longer perceive the
Corps as an agency hell-bent on filling streams and wetlands."6 Instead, the
Corps's regulatory program has matured into a traditional environmental
regulatory agency, staffed with trained biologists and increasingly
permeated with an ethos of professionalized management." As one Corps
biologist explained to me,
[W]hen I started, the principal ... responsibility of our program was really ...
to look at the impacts of construction activities on navigation.... And now
navigation only plays a very small part of what we evaluate. It's primarily now
an environmental program. So there's been a big change in the culture over the
years in the focus of the Corps.98
Because of these changes, compensatory mitigation now is very
different from the fig-leaf systems embraced by anti-regulatory staff in the
early 1980s. Requirements for it are more extensive, rules are stricter,
regulatory oversight is more demanding, the techniques used are backed by
stronger theories, and a large number of private and public entities now
specialize in providing mitigation." That does not mean compensatory
mitigation has fully proven itself. Some studies have found mixed results, or
worse,00 and the literature reviewing the performance of compensatory
92 See Timothy D. Searchinger, Wetand Issues 1993: Chaflenges and a New Approach, 4
MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 13, 65-70 (1993) (discussing the benefits of a watershed-based
approach); see also Gardner, supra note 91, at 557-62 (describing how wetland mitigation can
both protect the environment and preserve private rights).
93 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. 108-136, § 314, 117 Stat.
1392,1430-31(2003).
94 See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594,
19,594 (Apr. 10, 2008) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 325 and 332; 40 C.F.R. pt. 230) ("This rule
improves the planning, implementation and management of compensatory mitigation projects
by emphasizing a watershed approach....").
95 See Owen, supra note 7, at 31-34.
96 Id. at 23-24.
97 Id. at 23-26.
98 Id at 24 n. 155 (quoting Telephone Interview with Regulatory Dist. Chief (Aug. 25, 2014)).
99 For a recent study of the status of compensatory mitigation under section 404, including
discussion of the expanded mitigation industry, see generally U.S ARMY ENG'R INST. FOR WATER
REs. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 49.
100 See, e.g., Palmer & Hondula, supra note 55, at 10,557 (finding very little evidence of
success); see also Martin W. Doyle & F. Douglas Shields, Compensatory Mgadon for Streams
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mitigation is generally too sparse and too methodologically heterogeneous
to allow definitive conclusions.'1 We do not yet know, in other words, what
benefits this transformation has actually produced for the environment, and
our best evidence may just be the sense, widely shared among regulators
and mitigation providers, that performance has greatly improved.'02 But we
do know that for entities that hoped to ignore compensatory mitigation
requirements, or to satisfy them with just a cursory effort, the world has
become a less welcoming place.
In many ways, the initiatives of 2015 and 2016 just relocated these old
trends to a new agency setting.02 The vanguard of compensatory mitigation
policy had been implementation of Clean Water Act section 404, and other
regulatory programs had largely followed EPA and the Corps's lead.' m Other
agencies sometimes lagged, and the 2015 and 2016 mitigation policy
documents were partly designed to bring the United States Bureau of Land
Management-an agency not traditionally known for progressive
environmental policy-into the modem era." Absent from those documents,
however, are any dramatically new ideas about mitigation policy. Their
emphasis on advance mitigation, clearer and more consistent operating
rules, and integration of mitigation with landscape-scale planning instead
echoes priorities set by EPA and the Corps in their 2008 mitigation rule.' 0
This story also is notable for what it does not include. Most importantly,
the proponents of compensatory mitigation reform hardly ever identified
their efforts as measures to boost the capitalist system."' Even during the
Under the Clean Water Act: Reassessing Science and Redirecting Policy 48 J. AM. WATER
RESOURCES ASS'N 494, 500 (2012) ("The balance of published evidence suggests that current
practices of stream restoration-in terms of scale and technique-cannot be assumed to
provide demonstrable physical, chemical, or biological functional improvements.").
101 Joseph A. Morgan & Palmer Hough, Compensatory Mitigation Performance: The State of
the Science, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Wash. D.C.), Nov.-Dec. 2015, at 5, 10.
102 Owen, supra note 7, at 42-43.
103 See Hearings on the President's Memorandum on Mtgation, supra note 4, at 13
(prepared statement of Michael Bean, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Fish & Wildlife &
Parks, U.S. Dep't of the Interior) ("The Department's policy, and bureau policies in
development, will reflect and build upon this extensive history of mitigation as applied under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act.").
104 Id
105 Id. at 13-14; see Debra L. Donahue, Western Grazing: The Capture of Grass, Ground, and
Government 35 ENvTL. L. 721, 774 & n.387 (2005) (noting the origins of the Bureau of Land
Management's nickname "the Bureau of Livestock and Mining").
106 See Hearings on the President's Memorandum on Mtigation, supra note 4, at 13
(prepared statement of Michael Bean) ("That 2008 rule articulated many of the principles that
have been subsequently incorporated into the Department's policies ... ).
107 See, e.g., LEONARD SHABMAN ET AL., U.S ARMY ENG'R INST. FOR WATER RES., NATIONAL
WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING STUDY: EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUCCESSFUL MITIGATION:
THE PRIVATE CREDIT MARKET ALTERNATIVE, at vii-x (1994) (offering functional rather than
ideological justifications for mitigation banking); WHITE HOUSE OFFICE ON ENVTL. POLICY,
PROTECTING AMERICA'S WETLANDS: A FAIR, FLEXIBLE, AND EFFECTIVE APPROACH (1993)




Reagan Administration, debates about compensatory mitigation were driven
more by conflicts over regulatory intensity and states' rights.rather than by
IVMilton Friedman-style market ideals.os And later reformers' key goal was to
strike a compromise between political mandates to accommodate economic
development and legal mandates to protect the environment, and to make
permitting decisions in an expedited fashion.' 9 Compensatory mitigation
policy, in other words, evolved to fulfill agency goals, not to advance a free-
market agenda, even though the policies did sometimes bring regulated
industries the benefits of expedited and more flexible permitting."o
The emergence of the mitigation banking industry should not change
this narrative. One might think that promoting that industry, and
environmental markets more generally, was a central goal of compensatory
mitigation policy."' And there are a few whiffs of evidence consistent with
that view."' The preference for advance mitigation, for example, benefits the
mitigation banking industry, which generally must provide mitigation before
it releases credits."' But if promoting that industry-and, more broadly,
promoting the commodification of environmental values-really had been
the central goal of compensatory mitigation reform, current regulatory
structures would look quite different. Government agencies would not use
the traditional mitigation hierarchy, which prioritizes avoidance and
minimization over compensation, and thus relegates exchanges to a third-
priority position after more prohibitory regulatory approaches have proven
infeasible. 4 Similarly, the emphasis on integrating mitigation policy with
landscape- or watershed-scale planning would not exist, and the emphasis
would be on allowing the market to determine the geographic placement of
mitigation sites."' Even the policy favoring advance mitigation could be, and
in fact was, justified for reasons independent of any desire to boost the
mitigation banking industry, and it falls short of the industry's request for
108 Telephone Interview with Don Barry, supra note 53.
109 See generally Hough & Robertson, supra note 17 (emphasizing the importance of
functional rather than ideological justifications for the emergence of compensatory mitigation
practices).
110 See LaRoe, supra note 71, at 9 (noting "the increasing demands of resource management
agencies for habitat mitigation").
111 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (noting the prominence of this industry, at
least in academic discussions).
112 See, e.g, Memorandum on Mitigating Impacts on Natural Resources from Development
and Encouraging Related Private Investment, 81 Fed. Reg. 68,743, 68,753 (Nov. 6, 2015)
(including "encouraging related private investment" in the title of a presidential memorandum).
The body of the memorandum makes clear that mitigation banking is just one of the forms of
investment that are to be encouraged. Id at 68,743-44.
113 See WILIINSON ET AL., supra note 31, at 4 (noting that the government entities and private
foundations that run in-lieu fee programs often lack sufficient capital to provide advance
mitigation).
114 For a brief description of this hierarchy, see supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
115 See Womble & Doyle, supra note 87, at 272 ("[S]mall service areas will decrease demand
for compensatory mitigation credits.").
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policies that banned competing mitigation approaches."8 The industry, in
other words, has benefited because regulators like verifying compensatory
mitigation before they allow development, not because regulators have
some special affinity for mitigation banks."'
The net result of this evolution is that compensatory mitigation is
increasingly an agency-driven, somewhat planned policy approach designed
largely to advance the goals of environmental regulators. Those goals
include facilitating development; it is not prohibitory policy."8 They also suit
the interests, at least to some extent, of the private mitigation banking
industry."'9 But compensatory mitigation policy is a far cry from the kinds of
regulatory abdications that current conservative thought seems to favor. In
many of its present-day incarnations, it is sophisticated and somewhat
complex regulatory policy that sometimes draws upon, and provides
incidental benefits to, market-like systems.1 2 0 In an era when prevailing
conservative thought strongly opposes regulation-and, as recent efforts to
promote the coal industry indicate, has questionable * commitments to
markets'-that kind of policy seems unlikely to garner conservative
support.
And yet it still also seems, at first blush, like a poor candidate for
serious conservative opposition. If prohibitive environmental mandates are
going to exist, then regulated entities might appreciate the flexibility that
compensatory mitigation options can provide, while reserving their ire for
the prohibitive mandates. Indeed, until fairly recently, there was little
evidence of a conservative effort to undo. legislative or administrative
policies for compensatory mitigation. Conservatives did attack the laws and
regulations that prohibited environmentally destructive activities. Clean
Water Act section 404, for example, has been a particularly popular target
for a long time.122 But in legislative and administrative spheres, the attack
116 See Compensatory Mitigation for Loss of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 19,595
(Apr. 10, 2008) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 325 and 332; 40 C.F.R. pt. 230) (explaining the
disadvantages of in-lieu fee programs); see also id. at 19,599-600 (explaining that in-lieu fee
programs would not be phased out).
117 See id. at 19,595 (explaining how mitigation banks must secure approval before selling
credits).
118 See U.S ARMY ENG'R INST. FOR WATER REs. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 49, at
16 (noting that program goals include "promot[ing] regulatory efficiency, consistency, and
predictability").
119 See id. at 64, 91-92 (discussing mitigation banking's evolution).
120 See Owen, supra note 7, at 35 (discussing how North Carolina lawmakers utilized a
compensatory mitigation requirement for streams because it was compatible with continued
real estate development).
121 See Michael Grunwald, Trump's Love Affair with Coal, PouTIco (Oct. 15, 2017),
https://perma.cc/B85L-BK7H (quoting Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, explaining his efforts to
favor the coal industry: "What's the cost to keep America free? I'm not sure I want to leave that
up to the free market.").




focused on the underlying prohibitive mandates of those laws, not on using
compensatory mitigation as an option for compliance.
Nevertheless, the intellectual roots of that latter attack were beginning
to grow. They just were growing primarily in the courts.'
V. THE BEGINNINGS OF A BACKLASH
In 1972, Coy Koontz bought a parcel of undeveloped land near Orlando,
Florida.1 24 TWo decades later, he decided to develop his land. 125 But the
parcel contained wetlands, which were protected under both Florida and
federal law, and the St. Johns River Water Management District, which held
permitting authority under Florida's wetlands law, was unwilling to issue a
permit unless Koontz provided compensatory mitigation.'26 Koontz thought
the district's compensatory mitigation requests were excessive.1' The
district thought his offers were inadequate."8 After an impasse resulted and
his permit application was denied, Koontz sued for damages.129 The Florida
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of his claims, but the
United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that Koontz was
entitled to bring his damages claim.' if a government entity demanded
compensatory mitigation as a permitting condition, the Court held, that
compensatory mitigation had to have a nexus to the impacts of the
permitted project, and the degree of mitigation needed to be roughly
proportional to the degree of harm that the project would create.'2 ' A permit
denial following unconnected or excessive demands could be the basis for a
lawsuit.1 2
123 Interestingly, these ideas manifested themselves primarily in United States Supreme
Court cases. See discussion infra Part V. While the lower courts have considered many cases
involving compensatory mitigation, those cases often address more technical matters like the
legal sufficiency of mitigation measures. E.g, Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 833 F.3d 1274, 1288-89 (11th Cir. 2016) (rejecting an argument that the Corps
relied excessively upon compensatory mitigation); O'Reilly v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 477
F.3d 225, 235 (5th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the Corps had not explained why mitigation
would reduce a project's impacts to less-than-significant levels, but not questioning the use of
compensatory mitigation as a general practice). Debates about the very idea of compensatory
mitigation are basically absent from lower court opinions
124 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591-92 (2013).
125 Id. at 2592.
126 Id. at 2592-93.
127 Id. at 2593.
128 Id
129 Id
130 Id at 2591, 2597-98, 2603. The Court did not resolve that claim in his favor, and instead
remanded the matter to the Florida courts. Id. at 2598.
131 Id. at 2595, 2603.
132 Id. at 2598.
[Vol. 48:265282
2018] TURN AGAINST COMPENSATORY MITIGATION
Conservative activists celebrated Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District as a legal victoryln just as they had celebrated Nolan
v. California Coastal Commission' and Dolan v. City of Tigard"' the two
prior Supreme Court cases that had established the nexus and rough
proportionality requirements.'36 Some commentators have wondered why.137
Conservatives generally favor broad freedom to contract and are skeptical
of governmental efforts to police negotiated deals, yet all three decisions
seem to subvert those preferences.38 Nolan narrows the range of deals that
developers and governments can reach by eliminating from consideration
any mitigation measure that doesn't directly relate to the harms created by
the development at issue-even if that mitigation measure would be more
valuable to the community and cheaper for the developer.m9 Dolan places
courts in the rare position of evaluating the adequacy of consideration in a
negotiated deal; it thus replaces the normal libertarian presumptions of
contract law with a sort of unconscionability-on-steroids doctrine directed
toward government permitting.1 4 0 And Koontz extends these principles even
to mitigation offers that private parties refuse to accept.4 ' The net effect, it
would seem, is to narrow the space for negotiated deals. No wonder, then,
that Justice Kagan, in dissent, warned that local governments might react by
opting "'to simply deny permits outright without discussion or negotiation
rather than risk the crushing costs of litigation'; and property owners like
i3 See, eg., Brian T. Hodges, Koontz-A Banner Day for Property Rights, PAC. LEGAL
FOUND. (June 25, 2013), https://perma.cc/W4TK-JBE6 ("For a property rights advocates [sic],
reading today's decision in Koontz. . . is like being a kid trapped in a candy store.").
134 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
135 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
136 See Nolan, 483 U.S. at 837 (nexus); see also Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (rough
proportionality).
137 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions
Revisited, 86 IowA L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2000) (arguing that Nollan and Dollan weaken property rights
by limiting landowners' options).
13 See J.M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of La w, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 1447, 1454 (1987) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)) ("Since the late nineteenth century, American political
conservatism has generally been individualist in economic matters; it has ... viewed freedom of
contract as a fundamentally important value and resisted attempts to regulate it.").
139 See Fennell, supra note 137, at 74-75.
140 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (demanding "rough proportionality" between the exaction and
the claimed impact, and also requiring "some sort of individualized determination that the
required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development"); see also Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinldng
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 475 (1991) (raising similar
questions about Nollan).
141 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595-96 (2013) (holding that liability can exist even if: 1) the
applicant never accepts the offending condition, and 2) the permitting entity could have just
denied the permit without offering the condition).
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Koontz then would 'have no opportunity to amend their applications or
discuss mitigation options.""42
Nolan, Dolan, and Koontz all predated the current surge of legislative
and administrative opposition to compensatory mitigation policy, and Nollan
and Dolan also were decided during a time when compensatory mitigation
policies were expanding without any evidence of legislative or executive
branch opposition. It might be tempting, then, to see the cases as
disconnected from the current political twists and turns. Nevertheless, the
cases target similar policies, and even if their outcomes were just to cabin
these policies rather than to eliminate them, they seem to arise from similar
impulses. They are, in other words, the judicial ancestors of present-day
legislative and administrative attacks on compensatory mitigation. If we can
understand why conservatives would celebrate these cases-and many do-
that might help explain the current administrative and legislative attacks on
the very idea of compensatory mitigation.
One obvious explanation for the conservative support is a generalized
frustration with government regulation. According to this line of reasoning,
if regulators are the enemies, and they have embraced compensatory
mitigation, then compensatory mitigation also must be an enemy. Some
commentators have suggested that this is a key part of the story. Consider,
for example, Lee Anne Fennell's pre-Koontz analysis:
The Nollan/Dolan rules are perhaps best understood as a highly visible
symbolic protest against government excess. The decisions proved so
psychologically gratifying for landowners that few property-rights advocates
have been willing to look behind the decisions' anti-government rhetoric to
consider their true impact on property rights and the community.... The
bargaining context provided an opportunity to voice the pent-up frustrations of
the nation's landholders and to strike a strong moral victory against what was
perceived as the virtually unstoppable regulatory power of government.'"
It is not hard to find evidence of a similar reaction in contemporary debates.
In the rash of recent political statements against compensatory mitigation,
generalized frustration at governance is abundant, and nuanced critiques of
the idea of compensatory mitigation are rare. "We don't really know what
you're doing," the objectors seem to be saying, "but we know we don't like
it, and we're going to make you stop."
142 Id. at 2611 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz,
77 So. 3d 1220, 1231 (2011)).
143 Cf WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULIATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 61-62
(1995) (describing this kind of reasoning).
144 Fennell, supra note 137, at 13.
145 See, e.g, Hearings on the President's Memorandum on Atigation, supra note 4, at 2-3
(statement of Rep. Louie Gohmert, Chairman, S. Comm. on Oversight and Investigation)
(emphasizing generalized distrust of the President rather than specific objections to
compensatory mitigation policies).
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As Fennell points out, however, this way of thinking loses most of its
coherence once it purports to be something more than a gut reaction. If the
frustration is with regulatory prohibitions, then the focus of opposition
should be the prohibitions themselves, not the compensatory mitigation
options that might provide some flexibility.1 6 Yet there are reasons why the
conservative support of the Nollan/Dolan/Koontz trilogy, and opposition to
present-day compensatory mitigation, has more logic than one might initially
think. These reasons all share, at their root, a belief that the force of
regulatory prohibitions and the availability of compensatory mitigation are
actually closely connected.
One potential connection is conceptual. The term "compensatory
mitigation" shifts the focus of discussion from a developer's claimed
entitlement to act to the environmental harms that developer will allegedly
cause-and, then, to the sufficiency of his compensation for those harms.
The focus changes, in other words, from the developer's goals to the
impacted community's needs. To environmentalists and community
advocates, there is nothing problematic about that shift; they argue that
because the value of land to its owners arises from the embeddedness of
that land in human and natural communities, asking developers to attend to
the health of those communities is only fair.147 The problem, they argue,
instead lies with more libertarian conceptions of property that dangle the
false and damaging promise of near-absolute dominion over land.'4 But if
one starts with the opposite presumption-if one believes, to quote Richard
Epstein, that under a proper legal regime, "changes in habitat can be made at
will by owners unless and until they constitute a nuisance to the property of
others"-then the very ideas of permitting and compensatory mitigation
invert the proper legal order.4 1 "The language of mitigation," Epstein warns,
"artfully reverses the previous understanding that habitat belongs to the
person who owns the land." 50
146 See Fennell, supra note 137, at 4-5 (arguing that Nollan and Dolan place too much
attention on bargaining and not enough on the prior distribution of entitlements).
147 See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Taking Property Seriously in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
SUSTAINABILITy: THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS TO MEET ECOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 43, 55
(David Grinlinton & Prue Taylor eds., 2011).
148 See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & J.B. Ruhi, Background Principles, Takings, and Libertarian
Property:A Reply to Professor Huffman, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 805, 811, 815-16 (2010).
149 Richard A. Epstein, Babbitt v Sweet Home Chapters of Oregon: The Law and Economics
ofHabitat Conservation, 5 SUP. CT. EcoN. REV. 1, 3 (1997). Epstein also would allow government
to acquire control of land use by paying for the land. Id.
150 Id at 25. Epstein continues:
With the rise of mitigation permits, development (broadly defined to cover any alteration
of land or water) itself becomes a wrong, for which the set-aside of additional lands
under a public trust becomes the cure. The transfer of property rights from individual to




The possibility of compensatory mitigation also might encourage
lawmakers to enact stronger initial prohibitions.' Suppose, for example,
that an area contains two sets of natural habitat areas. Both are highly
degraded, and surrounding development has pushed one past the point of no
ecological return, but the other could be restored. 52 A developer wants to
build in the more degraded area. Environmental advocates want to restore
the other. If no compensatory mitigation option exists, regulators might be
inclined to just let the development proceed; their community would gain
the benefits of development while suffering no real ecological loss. But if a
compensatory mitigation option exists, lawmakers now have an incentive to
establish a negotiable prohibition on development even in the degraded
location and to use the negotiations to extract funds to support their
preferred restoration project. The same sort of thinking could play out on a
city- or state- or even nationwide scale. Of course, lawmakers may not
engage in such strategic thinking when creating environmental policy; I have
never actually heard a federal or state environmental regulator say that the
point of regulatory prohibitions was to shunt funding into compensatory
mitigation projects. But in policy debates, the actual motivations of
government employees do not seem to hold much influence, and plausible
fears can matter more than reality.
Closely related to this concern is another intuition: that in the absence
of compensatory mitigation options, some existing laws wouldn't be
enforced at all. Consider, again, the example in the preceding paragraph, and
suppose that the habitat area proposed for development is quite small.
Suppose, also, that this habitat has been subject to de jure protection for
years. Despite that legal protection, if a developer proposed to build in a
small and degraded area, regulators might not take any action to stop the
developer from proceeding. Enforcing environmental laws, as any regulators
knows, often begets outrage and requires using governmental resources, and
regulators might not want that bother. In such a circumstance, the
possibility of requiring compensatory mitigation is rather appealing to
regulators; rather than stating and then defending a bold "no," they can state
an accommodating "yes, if."" But if the developer suspects that "no" isn't
really a politically feasible option-if the threat of enforcement is really a
bluff-then accepting "yes, if' doesn't make much strategic sense. The
developer might be better off in a world where the regulator's only legally
allowable choices are a pure yes and a pure no.
This is hardly an unrealistic scenario. Indeed, this very dilemma is what
made compensatory mitigation an appealing policy option for some of its
151 See Fennell, supra note 137, at 15-16 (noting this concern in the land use context).
152 This is a stylized and somewhat unrealistic hypothetical, for in the real world, even a
degraded area could probably provide some ecological value by allowing stormwater
infiltration. But it might be nearly useless as habitat for native species.
153 See Dave Owen, Citical Habitat and the Challenge ofRegulating Smal Hans, 64 FIA. L.
REV. 141, 193-94 (2012) (describing this dilemma).
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early promoters." If potentially regulated entities just decide to ignore the
law, limits on agency resources would not allow agency staff to respond to
every instance of unauthorized environmental degradation. And agency
staff also knew, as one state regulator once told me, that because of political
support for economic development, "there is no stopping things, with very,
very, very limited exceptions."" Under such circumstances, compensatory
mitigation isn't something that detracts from the force of environmental law,
as some of its critics have alleged." Instead, it helps make environmental
protection possible, particularly in times when legislative support for
environmental enforcement continues to decline. And environmental law's
opponents may be increasingly aware of that fact.
The growing integration of compensatory mitigation requirements with
planning processes can heighten all of these concerns. From a regulator's
perspective, that integration is just a way of maximizing the societal payoff
from mitigation deals. But from a developer's perspective, the integration
with planning can increase the sense that his legitimate ambitions are being
leveraged to support someone else's schemes. Add to this the fact that
planning of any sort is increasingly a conservative bugaboo," and the
combination of compensatory mitigation and planning, despite all its
potential virtues, begins to seem like a box of dry tinder. The current
Administration, with its love of provocation, will not be shy about setting off
a few sparks.
Viewed in this light, the conservative support for Nollan, Dolan, Koontz,
and the present attacks on compensatory mitigation policy all begin to make
more sense. Surely there is an element of generalized frustration beneath
this opposition; if government permitting is nothing more than "a racket""
or "out-and-out plan of extortion,"160 then opposing any element of the
154 See, eg., SHABMAN ET AL, supra note 107, at 3 ("The most obvious benefit from private
credit market systems is the opportunity to secure mitigation for the many small wetland
impacts that would otherwise go unmitigated.").
155 See Owen, supra note 7, at 52-53 (noting that environmental regulation often involves
responding to thousands of instances of small harm).
156 See id. at 41 (quoting Telephone Interview with retired N.C. Dep't of Envtl. Quality Emp.
(Sept. 9, 2015)).
157 Eg, Jessica Owley, The Increasing Privatization of Environmental Permitting, 46 AKRON
L. REV. 1091, 1110 (2013) ("Mitigation banks have enabled the conversion of thousands of acres
of wetlands and endangered species habitats, facilitating development of those lands.").
158 See, eg., Adam M. Sowards, Opinion, Inside the ight to Undo BL's Planning Overhaul,
HIGH CouNTRY NEWS (Feb. 22, 2017), https://permacc/CNF5-WMRG (quoting a Republican
politician's claim that Bureau of Land Management Planning 2.0 rule, a rule designed to upgrade
planning, was "the first step to a totalitarian government, having bureaucrat planners making
legislation through administrative process").
159 Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 IowA L. REV. 407, 416
(1995). For a thorough response to Epstein's argument, see Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit
Power Revisited The Theory and Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64
DuKE L.J. 133 (2014).




permitting system is a valid protest. But beneath that abject frustration may
lie a set of cold-eyed calculations. Of course, the extent to which such
calculations are actually driving contemporary opposition to compensatory
mitigation is hard to discern. That recent opposition has been delivered
largely in sound bites and scattered legislative questioning, and a coherently
articulated critique has yet to emerge.'"' But Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz
foreshadow how that critique may yet coalesce, and why, if the staying
power of Nollan and Dolan is any clue, it may not go away.
VI. THE FUTURE OF COMPENSATORY MITIGATION
Over a year into the Trump Administration, Secretary Zinke has not
ended the practice of compensatory mitigation. Indeed, the order he signed
shortly before offering that boast never purported to do any such thing.'
While the order and other similar initiatives eliminated some attempts to
make compensatory mitigation policies more systematic and effective, they
did not eliminate the underlying legal frameworks that make compensatory
mitigation possible.16 ' In that sense, the Administration's actions are
somewhat similar to the Nollan/Dolan/Koontz trilogy, which, despite its
warm welcome from conservative activists, has not eliminated governmental
demands for exactions and is unlikely to do so anytime soon.
Yet the present assault on compensatory mitigation still matters. Even
if it does not eliminate the practice; it will likely reduce its prevalence. And
that, in turn, means limiting use of a regulatory technique that, at its best,
finds compromises between the worthy goals of economic development and
environmental protection. It also means limiting use of a technique to which
agency staff have gravitated for decades. For people who disdain agency
governance, either because they view agencies as power-hungry zealots or
as captured paper tigers, that recurring agency support may not mean much.
But for the many people who do value both economic development and
environmental quality, and who think government regulators know
something about how to do their jobs, the continued support of agency staff
161 See, e.g., Hearings on the President's Memorandum on Mitigation, supra note 4, at 1-3. In
asking questions, Republican members of the committee clearly demonstrated their skepticism
of and hostility toward the policy. But their critiques of the policy, to the extent they offered
them, focused primarily on the use of broad language, not on actual approaches to
compensatory mitigation. See, e.g., id. at 24 (questions from Rep. Louie Gohmert) ("When we
see vague, ambiguous language ... and there seems to be an abundance of those type of words,
it seems like sometimes, in this Administration, people are looking for words that have never
been legally defined, so that the sky can be the limit.").
162 See Zinke, Order No. 3349, supra note 1. The order makes no mention of ending the
practice of compensatory mitigation.
163 The Administration is also trying to weaken those mandates, most notably through
attempts at narrowing the geographic scope of regulatory jurisdiction under the Clean Water
Act. See Exec. Order 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497, 12,497-98 (Mar. 3, 2017). In the long run, these
attacks are likely to be more consequential than anything the Administration does about
compensatory mitigation.
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for compensatory mitigation policies ought to carry a lesson. These policies
would not have received so much agency support for so many years if
regulators did not believe they were doing something good."*
Any positive view of compensatory mitigation should be tempered, of
course, by the many critiques arguing that the practice of compensatory
mitigation often falls well short of its potential. Clearly those critiques have
some substance; indeed, the same agencies that have been advancing
compensatory mitigation policies have also raised concerns about the
inadequacies of their own practices." Yet those critiques highlight the
second, and more subtle, threat created by the current conservative attack
on compensatory mitigation policies. For decades, those policies have been
moving through cycles of critique and reform, and compensatory mitigation
practice now is quite different from what it was twenty or thirty years ago.i16
The initiatives of the Obama Administration, and the Bush Administration
before that, were promising advances amid these reform cycles."'" But now
the process of improvement may be stilled. In the long run, that loss of
institutional learning may be more important than a reduction in the actual
amount of compensatory mitigation.
This, too, is part of a much larger story. One of the most important,
though often obscure, stories of American environmental governance is our
evolving ability to find synergies and successful compromises between
economic imperatives and environmental protection. On many fronts, both
regulators and businesses have gotten better at working with each other,
and on many fronts, economic productivity has grown even as
environmental conditions improved." These changes are partly tied to the
willingness-which, of course, remains uneven-of some businesses to
integrate environmental protection into their culture, or even to rely upon
environmental mandates to generate business. But they are also closely tied
to the ability of government to govern, sometimes in sophisticated and
164 An alternative critique, grounded in public choice theory, is that compensatory
mitigation just makes regulators' jobs easier without providing any real benefit to the
environment. See supra note 55 and sources cited therein. Surely there is some truth to this
critique. But the supporters of compensatory mitigation policy aren't just mid-level bureaucrats
seeking to make their day jobs easier; instead, the supporters include many thoughtful political
appointees with strong and well-earned reputations as environmental advocates. That reality,
plus ongoing agency efforts to make compensatory mitigation more rigorous, shows that a
public choice critique no more than partially explains compensatory mitigation's appeal.
165 See, e.g., Rosanna P. Ciupek, Protecting Wetlands Under Clean Water Act §404: EPA '
Conservative Policy on Mitigation, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. Law Inst., Wash. D.C.),
Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 12, 13 ("Success is sometimes difficult to define, and is often illusive or, at
best, onerous to ascertain in the short time period within which most regulatory permitting
decisions are made.").
166 See U.S ARMY ENG'R INST. FOR WATER RES. & U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 49, at
11-12 (summarizing some of the changes).
167 See Memorandum on Mitigating Impacts on Natural Resources from Development and
Encouraging Related Private Investment, 81 Fed. Reg. 68,743, 68,743 (Nov. 6, 2015); Owen,
supra note 7, at 49.
168 Owen, supra note 7, at 48-55.
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innovative ways, and to learn from those innovations. Compensatory
mitigation is just one example of this phenomenon. It emerged as an
innovative regulatory technique designed to accommodate the needs of
regulated entities and the environment's protectors, initially performed fairly
poorly in key parts of those tasks, and has been evolving towards better
practices that respond to the early concers"'-with a long way still to go.
But none of that can happen if government lacks the capacity to innovate
and to reform, and the present attempts to diminish the size of government
and hamstring the remaining staff are direct attacks on that capacity.o
Conservative rhetoric now often emphasizes the supposed incompatibility of
environmental protection and economic growth."' And the attacks on
compensatory mitigation policy are just one piece of a larger effort to turn
those claims into reality.
That effort may yet fail, and the current spate of attacks on
compensatory mitigation may be forgotten. Businesses, regulators, and
environmentalists may all decide that the compromises compensatory
mitigation offers are basically good, and that improving the practice makes
more sense than opposing it. Perhaps in ten years the policy frontiers will
involve developing better systems for tracking and monitoring
compensatory mitigation, not finding ways to eliminate the practice.
But that future is by no means assured. For the reasons this Essay has
explored, some degree of conservative opposition to compensatory
mitigation will likely continue, particularly during periods when regulatory
opponents sense weakness in environmental law. The current opposition, in
other words, is worth taking seriously, and the practice of compensatory
mitigation will need its defenders. Their support should not be unqualified;
the optimal future for compensatory mitigation policy would involve more
rigorous analyses of past and present measures and continued efforts at
reform. But nearly all of environmental policy is a highly imperfect work in
progress. That does not make it any less worthy of a strong defense.
169 See, e.g., Salzmnan & Ruhl, supra note 41, at 652-655 (discussing the evolution of wetland
mitigation banking).
170 See Kevin Bogardus & Hannah Northey, Buyout Stories: 'WeAre Kind ofBeingHoilowed
Out 'E&E NEws: GREENWIRE (Nov. 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/JV4Y-MNBY.
171 E.g, Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017).
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